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No. 14594. Estates; Power of County Court to Order Audit.
Dunklee, etc. v. Countu Court of Denver, et al. Decided April 8, 1940.
District Court, Denver. Hon. Joseph J. Walsh, Judge. Affirmed.
En Banc.
FACTS: A question raised as to whether, i.n the matter of the
Estate of George W. Clayton, deceased, the Denver County Court had
jurisdiction to order a general audit of accounts of the Clayton College
Trustees and Clayton Trust Commission.
HELD:
1. "Where a testator so directs, or such intent is apparent from his will, the cou.nty court, under its original jurisdiction
in probate matters conferred by Section 23, Article VI of the Constitution and the terms of Section 227, Chapter 176, '35 C.S'.A., properly
may continue to supervise the administration of a testamentary trust
created by such will to the extent commanded thereby, notwithstanding the debts of the estate and the legacies fixed by the will have been
paid in full and the executors discharged."
2. It is the opinion of the court that the express provisions of
the Clayton will manifestly demand the application of the above rule
to the situation under consideration.
3. Although said Section 227 was adopted in 1903, one year
after the alleged effective date of the discharge of the executor, the estate
proper was in the process of administration until the entry of a 1905
decree, and thereafter until the executor filed in the County Court his
receipt as trustee.
4. It would seem certain that even if the said Section 227 were
given retroactive effect, it being purely remedial and procedural in
character, no contract or vested right would be violated.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Knous. Mr. Justice Bouck and Mr. Justice Bock dissent.
No. 14663. Estates: Claim Against Estate Based Upon Oral
Statements of Decedent: Evidence: Consideration: Witness. Parker V.
Hilliard, Jr., etc. Decided April 8, 1940. District Court, Denver.
Hon. Henry A. Hicks, Judge. Affirmed. In Dept.
HELD:
1. Testimony in support of a claim against an estate,
consisting entirely of a recital of alleged oral statements of deceased
against his interest, is the weakest of evidence.
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2. Evidence to support a claim against an estate should be clear
and convincing as to its existence as well as to the amount of the claim.
3. It may be questioned whether past services when rendered
under circumstances which create no legal liability, constitute consideration for a subsequent promise.
4. Where the incompetency of a witness is only partial, an objection on that ground should not be entertained until he is asked to testify
to those matters as to which he is incapacitated.
5.
" 'Where a witness which a party tenders is compete.nt as to
certain facts, but not as a general witness, and he is objected to as incompetent,-the party tendering him should state what he proposes to
prove by him, so that the court may know that it is proper; otherwise
an appellate court can not say that there is any error in refusing to
allow him to testify.' "
Opinion by Mr. Justice Knous. Mr. Justice Bock and Mr. Justice
Burke concur.
No. 14540. Criminal Law; Probation; Constitutional Law.
People v. District Court. Decided April 8, 1940. In re Probation
of Siraguso. Original Proceedings. Writ of Mandamus ordered
issued. En Banc.
1. A district judge may not grant probation to conHELD:
victed defendant over objection of district attorney.
2. Chapter 140, Section 1, '35 C.S.A. (S.L. 1931, Chapter 136,
Section 1) providing that the judge of any district court, may, in certain instances "with approval of the district attorney" grant probation
in certain cases, is constitutional.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Bouck. Mr. Justice Bock dissents. Mr.
Justice Burke concurs in the conclusion and Mr. Chief Justice Hillard
not participating.

Wills; Incompetency. In re Estate of McCrone.
No. 14748.
Decided April 8, 1940. County Court, Denver. Hon. Henry Bruce
Teller, Judge. Reversed. In Dept.
1. Although a testator, at the time of executing his
HELD:
will had previously been found incompetent, and the court had appointed for him and his estate a conservator, and although such appointment was in force at the date of execution of the will, it is possible
that the testator may have recovered and have bee~n of sound mind and
memory.
2. Where caveator alleges facts of incompetency and appointment of conservator, and proponent answers alleging that testator was
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mentally competent at time of making will, such defense, if proved.
would be good and it was error for the trial court to sustai.n a demurrer
to the answer.
3.
The appointment of a conservator is not conclusive.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Young.
Mr. Justice Knous concur.

Mr. Chief Justice Hilliard and

No. 14315.
Insurance; Suit for Recovery of Money: Right to
,Jury Trial: Cross-Examination. Kansas City Life Insurance Company v. Lathrop. Decided April 8, 1940. District Court. Denver.
Hon. George F. Dunklee, Judge. Reversed. En Banc.
HELD:
1. Where suit is based upon an insurance policy provision for recovery of money, it is an action at law and it was error for
the trial court to refuse a trial by jury.
2.
Where suit is based upon claim for disability and defense is
to effect that $3500.00 was paid to plaintiff in full settlement it was
error for trial court to sustain objection to following question put to
plaintiff on cross-examination: "Now, Mr. Lathrop, at that time what
did you understand this $3500.00 was being paid to you for?"
Opinion by Mr. Justice Bouck.

No. 14749.
Equity: Fraud. Scott v. McClain. Decided April
8. 1940. District Court, Denver. Hon. Henry S. Lindsley. Judge.
Affirmed.
In Dept.
FACTS:
A.
Plaintiff brought suit on grounds of fraud against
defendants alleging certain fraudulent representations as to a lease and
that defendants failed to put lease in good standing thereby causing
plaintiff to lose his interest.
B. Defendants claim that plaintiff failed to offer to do equity
by restoring them to substantially the same position which they occupied previously.
HELD:
I.
The trial court correctly found for plaintiff, and
demurrers of defendants to complaint were properly overruled because
it appears that the lease was lost through the fault and neglect of defendants, and that plaintiffs could, therefore, not restore the lease to
the defendants.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Bock.
Mr. Justice Young concur.

Mr. Chief Justice Hilliard and
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No. 14588. Notes; Statute of Limitations. District Landowners Trust u. Bengston. Decided April 8, 1940. District Court,
Denuer. Hon. George F. Dunhlee, Judge. Affirmed. En Banc.
HELD:
I. Defense of statute of limitations against a suit on
a note held to be good where it appears that more than six years elapsed
after last payment.
2. On conflicting evidence trial court held against plaintiff's
contention that defendants were estopped to raise question of statute
of limitations, and appellate court will not disturb trial court's finding.
3.
Case, under statute, not to be taken out of rule of statute of
limitations unless alleged new promise or acknowledgment is in writing.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Bakke. Mr. Justice Bock and Mr. Justice Burke dissent.
No. 14605.
Sanitary Sewer District Bonds; Failure of Town
Treasurer to Pay in Numerical Order; Parties. Wanguild v. Town of
Haxtun. Decided April 8, 1940. District Court, Phillips County.
Hon. Arlington Taylor, Judge. Reversed. En Banc.
FACTS: Suit brought against town for tortious failure of its
agent to comply with plain provisions of the law relative to the disbursement of trust funds coming into his hands by virtue of his office.
The town treasurer failed to redeem sanitary sewer district bonds in
their numerical order.
HELD:
1. Colorado has no statute limiting the liability of
municipalities for its agents' tortious acts in failing to comply with the
statute requiring payment of trust funds in a specific manner, and therefore, such suit may be maintained.
2. In such case the town treasurer need not be made a party.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Bakke.

Domestic Relations: Custody of Minor Child; Conflict of Laws;
Juvenile Courts; Habeas Corpus; Jurisdiction. No. 14759. Decided June 17,. 1940. Snyder v. Schmoyer. District Court,
Denver. Hon. Floyd F. Miles, Judge. Affirmed. En Banc.
FACTS:
A. Father sought and obtained writ of habeas corpus
awarding him custody of minor child. The petition for the writ was
based largely on a judgment rendered by Montana Court, after a full
hearing on petition by mother, determining that each parent should
have the child six months of each year until child is of school age.
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B. The mother had custody of child first and brought the child
to Denver and refused to surrender him to the father at the end of her
six months' period.
C. The mother, anticipating action by the father, filed a "petition in dependency" in the Denver Juvenile Court. This petition was
prepared and acknowledged before, but, according to filing stamp, was
not filed until the same day that father filed his petition in District
Court.
HELD:
1. The district court has jurisdiction in some cases
under habeas corpus to determine the matter of the custody of minor
children in counties having a population of over 100,000 (Denver).
2. The fact that exclusive jurisdiction has bee,n given to the
Denver Juvenile Court in matters concerning the custody of minor
children generally does not deprive the district court of its jurisdiction,
unless the jurisdiction of the juvenile court is properly invoked or
available.
3. Estoppel by judgment is available against the mother since
it is not reasonable to believe that there could have been any such
changed conditions subsequent to decree of the Montana Court as
would justify a re-litigation of the facts already determined by that
court.
4. Parties are bound by judgments rendered by courts of competent jurisdiction, whether they expressly agree to that judgment or
not; an express agreement that a particular judgment should be rendered gives to that judgment no peculiar character and renders it no
more sacred than the ordinary judgment.
5. Parties who have voluntarily submitted their controversy to
a court having jurisdiction of the subject matter cannot be allowed to
question its authority.
6. Every possible controversy arising concerning the custody
of the child does not ipso facto give the juvenile court jurisdiction.
The juvenile court was without jurisdiction to proceed with any action
on the ground of dependency in this case, for there was involved no
new "controversy," as the word is used in the statute.
7. The mother alleges that the father will take the child to
Canada and there keep it away from her. It is hardly proper for a
Colorado tribunal to adjudicate a possible contempt matter arising in
the court of another state.
8. While the language of the statute giving the juvenile court
jurisdiction in cases of dependency states that the jurisdiction of district
courts to dispose of questions of custody of children in divorce cases
shall not "interfere with the jurisdiction of the juvenile court in cases
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concerning the dependency of such children," such language shall be
construed as meaning dependency in fact and not a fictitious condition.
9. It is not the law that both the child and its custodians may
be dragged from court to court and subjected to a ceaseless round of
discomfort and litigation at the whim of the petitioner.
10. The decree of the Montana court states that it is (and in
fact it is) for the best interests of the child to spend part of its time
in the city and part on a ranch.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Bakke. Mr. Justice Bock concurs in the
result. Mr. Chief Justice Hilliard, Mr. Justice Bouck and Mr. Justice
Young dissent.
XVater Rights; Conditional Decrees. No. 14474. Decided June 17,
1940. Taussig, et al. v.Moffat Tunnel Water and Deuelopment
Company. District Court, Grand County. Hon. Charles E.
Herrick, Judge. Decrees modified and, as modified, affirmed. En
Banc.
HELD:
1. Conditional decrees concerning water rights were
granted by our courts prior to statutory authority. In 1919, the legislature gave statutory authority for such conditional decrees and provided
for certain procedure.
2. Construing Section 195 of Chapter 90, 1935 C. S. A., it is
held that a court may enter a conditional decree before the diversion and
application of water to a beneficial use have been wholly or partially
completed.
3.
" 'Although the appropriation is not deemed complete until
the actual diversion or use of the water, still if such work be prosecuted
with reasonable diligence, the right relates to the time when the first
step was taken to secure it.' "
4. In effect, to require the water company to complete its project
before granting it any decree would constitute a denial of the constitutional right to divert waters to a beneficial use.
5. It is not an unusual practice in acquiring a decree that the
first step be the making of a survey of the project.
6. Under Section 195, where a conditional decree is granted, the
court retains supervisory jurisdiction of the question of reasonable diligence and the bona fides of petitioners for conditional decrees.
7. Where only conditional decrees are involved, it is immaterial
that the claim statement omits the number of acres of land lying under
the proposed project, although before final decree the claim statement
must be completed.
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8. Where conditional decrees are involved, it is not necessary
that the appropriation be for specific water and for a designated and
definite purpose. However, the maximum amount of the water to be
diverted must be stated.
The evidence must show a definite proposed use, even for a
9.
conditional decree. It is not good practice to predicate a beneficial use
in a conditional or final decree "for beneficial purposes other than irrigation." The language is too indefinite. Some uses have preferences over
others and should be specifically stated, even in a conditional decree.
The decrees should be modified to show that they relate only to irrigation, domestic and municipal uses.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Bock. Mr. Chief Justice Hilliard not
participating.
Damages: Exemplary: Verdict; Costs. No. 14760. Decided June
10, 1940. Liuingston v. Utah.Colorado Land and Livestock
Co. District Court, Moffat County. Hon. Charles E. Herrich.
Judge. Reversed. En Banc.
1. It is the general rule that exemplary damages are
HELD:
not recoverable in the absence of proof of actual damages. Upon the
question of whether it is essential that the money extent of the actual
damages must be found as a predicate to an award of punitive damages,
the authorities are in conflict.
2. Colorado follows the rule that where actual damages occur,
although not determined in money value, punitive damages will be
upheld.
3.
But where a jury expressly finds no actual damages, it may
not award punitive damages.
4. The recommendation of the jury that both parties pay their
own costs is improper and not binding on the court.
5. The taxing of costs as to the branch of the case resolved in
favor of the plaintiff was discretionary with the trial court, and under
the facts, the trial court did not abuse its discretion.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Knous.
participating.
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A LAWYER'S VIEWPOINT
The following excerpe is taken from an address
before a meeting of the American Bankers Association by Mr. John H. Freeman of the law firm of
Fulbright, Crooker and Freeman, of Houston,
Texas, on the subject:

ADVANTAGES OF
THE CORPORATE EXECUTOR
AND TRUSTEE
"Another advantage is access to markets, perhaps the product of
experience, but none the less a real advantage. Few could hope to
have the ready ability to go intelligently into any desired market that
is possessed by the modern trust department or company.
"The qualities of financial strength, permanency and dependability afford prestige; there is the 'know-how' that comes from experience,
the contacts that come from repetition and continuity of similar work
or transactions, the knowledge that comes from adequate factual information-all of these put the corporate executor and trustee in a preferred position with respect to transactions affecting trust property."
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Each of the institutions named below acts
as Executor and Trustee:
THE AMERICAN NATIONAL BANK
THE COLORADO NATIONAL BANK
THE DENVER NATIONAL BANK
THE INTERNATIONAL TRUST COMPANY
THE UNITED STATES NATIONAL BANK
Members of Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation

